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ABTRACT 
Smart specialisation is the most ambitious regional innovation programme ever to be 
launched in the European Union and it affords a unique opportunity to explore the 
interplay between institutions, innovation and development. The article argues that 
smart specialisation makes unprecedented demands on public sector bodies to nurture 
more collaborative forms of economic search and craft more inclusive forms of regional 
governance. To explore these issues with the granularity they deserve, the article offers 
detailed case studies of two regional innovation policy repertoires in Wales and the 
Basque Country, where it is argued that the “old industrial region” moniker conceals as 
much as it reveals because, for all their apparent similarities, they have pursued very 
different repertoires. The article concludes on a more general note by suggesting how 
regional innovation studies could be enriched by engaging with theoretical perspectives 
from other fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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A new era in the history of European regional policy began in 2014 with the launch of the 
Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) programme, the most 
ambitious regional innovation programme ever introduced in the European Union. The fact 
that innovation-related measures have been the fastest growing theme in the past twenty-five 
years of the Structural Funds speaks volumes for the political resonance of the innovation 
agenda in EU policy circles. From just 8% of total regional policy expenditure in the 1988-
1994 programming period, innovation-related measures have increased to nearer a third of 
the total in the 2014-2020 period. This means that the Structural Funds are increasingly the 
vehicle for a spatially targeted form of innovation policy rather than simply a spatial 
expression of social welfare policy. Political resonance may help to explain the cachet 
attached to regional innovation policy, but to what extent does the new smart specialisation 
agenda really address the underlying problems of old industrial regions?   
Some of these problems have a familiar ring (like the “regional innovation paradox”), while 
others have a more recent pedigree (like the “age of austerity”). The regional innovation 
paradox is a highly condensed way to summarise the challenge of innovation in less 
developed regions (LDRs). It highlights the fact that, while LDRs have a greater need for 
innovation-related investment, they also have a lower capacity to absorb public funds 
earmarked for innovation compared to economically more advanced regions (Oughton et al, 
2002; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 2000; Muscio et al, 2015). The weaker absorptive capacity in 
LDRs reflects a noxious cocktail of factors, including mature industrial structures and low 
value-added activities in the regional economy as well as weak and sometimes corrupt public 
administrations. The interplay of economic and institutional development is attracting more 
and more attention from theorists and policy-makers alike, not least because there is 
mounting evidence to suggest that the quality of regional governance matters to economic 
performance and public service provision to a greater extent than was once thought (Charron 
et al, 2012; Rodriguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2014).      
The RIS3 agenda also faces a more recent set of problems, many of which have been 
triggered by the “age of austerity”.  Far from being a natural visitation, the “age of austerity” 
is a conscious a political strategy on the part of neo-liberal governments in thrall to a pre-
Keynesian creed who are ideologically fixated on balancing budgets and shrinking the state. 
One of the many debilitating effects of this pre-Keynesian creed is to eviscerate the public 
sector in many European countries, inflicting the greatest damage on the poorest regions, 
which are more dependent on public sector employment and public sector investment. 
Page 2 of 24
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 
3 
 
Eviscerating the public sector by cutting investment, employment and expertise presents 
major problems for the smart specialisation agenda because the latter is predicated on a 
smarter, more agile and more experimental state, attributes that are difficult to reconcile with 
a besieged public sector (Morgan, 2016).  
To address the above issues in a more granular fashion the article is organised as follows. 
Section 2 identifies some of the key institutional challenges facing the RIS3 agenda, 
especially with respect to the regional state, which is expected to rise to the occasion by 
nurturing novel economic search processes, in which the regional state acts more as the 
curator than the controller of regional innovation projects, and new forms of governance, in 
which the regional state is expected to broker more inclusive forms of governance.  
Section 3 sacrifices breadth for depth by focusing on the regional innovation policy (RIP) 
repertoires of the Basque Country and Wales, where the regional state has played a highly 
interventionist role for the past thirty years. The main aim of this comparative section is to 
explore the formation and evolution of these regionally-specific repertoires and assess how 
they have dealt with the challenge of novelty. 
Section 4 distils the comparative analysis and argues that regional innovation policy studies 
would be enriched by drawing on two streams of hitherto unrelated theory: (i) the new 
industrial policy literature, which features the concept of the embedded state, a state that 
eschews hierarchies and aims to work in and through networks to foster innovation and (ii) 
the institutional entrepreneurship literature, which helps us to avoid the trap of state-
centricity by focusing on how actors in and beyond the state effect institutional change.   
1. Smart Specialisation and the Challenge of Novelty 
Evolutionary economists have done much to help us to understand the dynamic and restless 
character of capitalist development, a process succinctly captured in Schumpeter’s 
compelling characterisation of capitalism as a process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 
1943).  Contemporary evolutionary theorists have refined this perspective by arguing that the 
interplay of variety and selection mechanisms is what propels capitalist evolution and, 
because economic selection tends to destroy effective variation, some process is needed to 
replenish variation – and that process is innovation, “the generator of novelty” (Metcalfe, 
2014:13). While firms are the main vehicles for generating novelty in this perspective, public 
institutions are also called upon to play important roles to stimulate the generation of variety, 
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promote connectivity between actors and reduce the threat of lock-in by fostering openness 
and diversity (Metcalfe, 1994; Boschma, 2005). Promoting connectivity is particularly 
important because: 
“capitalist economies are ignorance economies, in which highly specialised 
individuals and teams know a great deal about very little, so that the productive 
strength of the system, its collective knowing, depends on how the pools of 
specialised, narrow understandings are connected. Connectivity requires organisation 
and organisation depends on rules of the game and on belief and trust so that we can 
rely upon the testimony and actions of others. Failure of trust leads to failure of 
connectivity and a corresponding loss of system coherence” (Metcalfe, 2014:11). 
 In advanced regions “connectivity” will often be secured through the purposive actions of 
talented firms (and sustained by advanced regional innovation systems) but this is not the 
case in less advanced regions, where public institutions are needed to broker connections and 
nurture novelty.  Although novelty t nds to be framed in narrow economic terms – where it is 
applied to technologies, products and services – it is equally applicable to the political sphere, 
where institutional arrangements can either foster or frustrate innovation depending on 
whether the institutions of development are enabling or constraining, inclusive or extractive 
in nature (North, 2005; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Ashein and Gertler, 2006; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). The question of institutional capacity has begun to loom large for scholars 
and policy-makers alike. Although regulatory authorities like the European Commission (EC) 
used to be very coy about encroaching on politically sensitive issues like the competence and 
probity of national and sub-national institutions, these reservations have been rapidly 
jettisoned because the “institutional deficit” in many Member States is now so acute that it is 
compromising the efficacy of European regional policy.  
These institutional deficits are often most pronounced at the sub-national level, especially in 
Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania and Bulgaria, where the less developed regions are believed 
to be “stuck in a low-administrative quality, low growth trap” (EC, 2014:168).  A similar 
conclusion emerged from a highly influential analysis of quality of government and 
innovative performance, which found that high levels of corruption and low levels of policy-
making capacity were the most important governmental qualities that constrained the efficacy 
of innovation policies; so much so that  institutional reforms to reduce rent-seeking and 
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combat corruption need to be considered as  “de facto innovation policies for the regions in 
the periphery of Europe” (Rodriguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2014:22). 
The question of institutional capacity was taken seriously in the design of the RIS3 
programme, perhaps for the first time in 25 years of regional innovation policy. RIS3 is 
officially defined as an integrated, place-based economic transformation agenda that seeks to 
do five important things: (i) focus policy support and investments on key national/regional 
priorities (ii) build on the strengths of each country/region (iii) support technological as well 
as practice-based innovation (iv) involve stakeholders and encourage innovation and 
experimentation and (v) provide an evidence base by having a sound monitoring and 
evaluation system (European Commission, 2012: 8). In terms of intellectual antecedents, 
RIS3 is predicated on the place-based approach to regional development, an approach 
recently associated with the work of Fabrizio Barca. There are two key aspects to the place-
based approach: the first is that geographical context really matters and here context is 
understood to include the social, cultural and institutional characteristics of the place; and the 
second is the idea that most of the knowledge for the development of a place is not readily 
available in situ and must be fashioned through a participatory and deliberative process 
involving the interplay of local and external actors (Barca, 2009; Barca et al, 2012).   
 
To design and deliver the RIS3 programme the EC prescribed a number of operational steps, 
two of the most challenging of which concern economic search and inclusive governance. 
Although these operational steps are presented as prosaic technical procedures, they are 
actually intensely political activities that presuppose a high degree of competence on the part 
of the regional state (Morgan, 2013a). This serves to illustrate the point that the “policy mix” 
is a more complex assemblage than we commonly think and innovation policy studies needs 
to address it in a more critical spirit (Flanagan et al, 2011).    
 
The first “step” concerns the design of a new “entrepreneurial discovery process” in which 
various actors, particularly firms, universities, research institutes and the like, are enjoined to 
collaborate to explore the domains of R&D and innovation in which the region is most likely 
to excel given its existing capabilities. This “step” is likely to trigger intense struggles around 
which agents are deemed to be appropriate “entrepreneurial actors” and whether the process 
is designed to privilege the role of the business community, in which case it might be 
criticised for being a de facto neoliberal agenda. However, the emphasis on “entrepreneurial 
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discovery” is much broader than a neoliberal agenda and it resonates with what regional 
scholars have called “institutional entrepreneurship”, which highlights how actors broadly 
defined can act as purposive agents to transform the institutional settings in which they are 
embedded (Sotarauta and Pulkkinen, 2011).  
The second “step” concerns the creation of a more inclusive governance structure to ensure 
participation and ownership of the RIS3 strategy. According to the European Commission, a 
truly inclusive RIS3 governance structure “should be able to prevent capture by specific 
interest groups, powerful lobbies, or major regional stakeholders” (EC, 2012:21). A 
genuinely inclusive governance structure, in other words, would include stakeholders selected 
for their competence in the network rather than their status in the hierarchy, a radical 
institutional innovation in its own right because it runs counter to everything we know about 
how regional elites deploy their power and patronage in the face of novelty (Morgan, 2013a). 
Fashioning a more collaborative process of economic search and crafting a more inclusive 
governance structure are goals that will stretch the very best regional administrations and 
they may be too demanding for the poorest regions, where the weakness of regional economy 
and regional polity will compromise the promise of the RIS3 programme (Foray, 2014). The 
great danger of the RIS3 programme as it stands is that it is perceived as a policy template, 
offering prescribed steps for all regions regardless of regional context. If we have learned 
anything from the history of regional innovation policy over the past 25 years, it is that place-
specificity is the single most important variable in shaping the policy mix. In short, “one size 
for all” is a recipe for disaster because there is no such thing as an “ideal model” for 
innovation policy when the spatial context varies so much as between central, peripheral and 
old industrial regions (Todtling and Trippl, 2005). Indeed, as the following section shows, 
place-specificity varies a good deal even within the category of “old industrial regions”, a 
category that often conceals more than it reveals.     
 
2. Repertoires of Regional Innovation Policy 
The regional realm is such a heterogeneous realm that it makes no sense to speak in bald 
terms about “the region” as a developmental space or about the role of “the regional state” in 
fostering/frustrating economic renewal (Morgan, 2013a).  Such regional diversity means that 
we have to understand the specificities of a region – including the peculiarities of its 
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economic structure, the idiosyncracies of its institutions, the character of its political culture 
and its relational connections in the world – before we can begin to appreciate what regional 
innovation policy can feasibly accomplish. Given the powerful role of habits and routines in 
economic life, one of the questions addressed in this section is the extent to which regional 
innovation policy (RIP) repertoires have been subject to path dependent processes.  A RIP 
repertoire refers to an assemblage of cognitive processes, policies and practices that is 
routinely used to frame and foster a particular model of regional development and it is shaped 
by an inherited “artifactual structure”, which consists of the accumulated beliefs, institutions, 
instruments and technologies that condition the choices of agents (North, 2005). Because it is 
politically fashioned by the dominant political elite and culturally embedded in the prosaic 
practices of officials, a RIP repertoire is more deeply rooted in the institutional fabric of a 
region than conventional policy studies might imagine. The Basque Country and Wales 
would seem to be ideal candidates for such an inquiry because they have pursued regional 
innovation policies longer than most other regions in Europe. 
While each regional innovation system has its own peculiarities, reflecting the significance of 
place-specificity, a three-tiered organisational structure for governing research and innovation 
has been discerned in many countries based on the following: a governmental tier, consisting 
of the cabinet and government departments; an intermediate tier, consisting of agencies and 
research councils and the like; and an operational tier, consisting of research and innovation 
actors like firms, universities and research organisations (Boekholt et al, 2002; OECD, 2002).  
As we will see, one of the great contrasts in the RIP repertoires in Wales and the Basque 
Country concerns the changing dynamics of this three-tiered system. In Wales the repertoire 
has become ever more state-centric following the political decision to abolish intermediate 
agencies. In contrast, the Basque Country presents a fascinating paradox because the regional 
state has been pervasive without being invasive: it has respected the principle of subsidiarity 
and eschewed state-centricity.  
3.1 The Basque Repertoire of Regional Innovation Policy 
With a population of 2.1 million the Basque Country is an old industrial region with a 
difference: it is one of the most prosperous regions in Spain and it outperforms the national 
average on a whole series of indicators, especially GDP per capita, educational attainment, 
patenting and unemployment (Valdaliso, 2015). Indeed, the Basque Country is widely 
regarded as an old industrial region that successfully met the challenge of economic renewal 
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in the 1970s and 1980s, so much so that it is internationally lauded as “a regional 
transformation success story” (OECD, 2011:42). Although many factors contributed to this 
process of economic renewal, three factors merit special attention: (i) mature industrial 
sectors that sustained a dogged commitment to incremental innovation (ii) a market-facing 
regional technology network that helped indigenous firms to upgrade and (iii) a highly 
supportive regional state that enjoyed the highest degree of fiscal autonomy in the EU 
(Morgan, 2013a).  Economic renewal was also underwritten by a regional political system 
that furnished a remarkable degree of policy stability, a great contrast with the stereotype of a 
region riven by internecine conflict and ethnic terrorism.  The moderate nationalist party, the 
Basque National Party (PNV), has been in office for most of the time since 1978, when 
democracy was restored after the Franco dictatorship, a striking example of single party 
hegemony and the main reason for industrial policy continuity (Valdaliso, 2015). 
A combination of political stability and policy continuity (institutional features that are not 
necessarily correlated) enabled successive Basque governments to fashion a regional 
innovation system that stands at the “thickest” end of the spectrum of institutional thickness 
(Morgan, 2013b). This system, formally known as the Science, Technology and Innovation 
(STI) network, has been evolving for thirty years and it now constitutes a dense ecosystem of 
public and private institutions that has grown in number and complexity as we will see. The 
evolution of the STI network has been marked by three distinctive institutional features. First, 
the Department of Industry has played a pivotal role in driving the formation and evolution of 
the network, both directly and indirectly through SPRI, its regional development agency. 
Second, Basque universities have played a very modest role in the STI network largely 
because of the weakness of the university sector as an economic actor. Third, to compensate 
for the shortcomings of the universities, the Basque government invested heavily in the 
creation of a network of technology centres, with the emphasis on applied rather than basic 
research and on technology transfer rather than knowledge generation because this focus was 
most attuned to the task of industrial upgrading. The political status of these technology 
centres is such that they are widely regarded as the “jewel in the crown” of the STI network 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Although this state-sponsored system enabled the Basque 
Country to negotiate the industrial restructuring challenge of the 1980s, when technology 
transfer was the name of the game, the big question now is whether it is fit for the future, 
when knowledge generation is assuming ever more importance for advanced manufacturing 
and the serviced economy. This was one of the main concerns of the OECD when it said “the 
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path dependency associated with previous policies and strategies may make it more difficult 
for the Basque Country to evolve in pace with changing conditions of competitiveness” 
(OECD, 2011:104). 
Although the Basque RIP repertoire has exhibited strong signs of policy path dependence 
over the past 35 years, the historical record also reveals that a whole series of novel features 
have been introduced as and when necessary. Two of the main sources of policy path 
dependence have been (i) the longevity of one-party hegemony, which meant that regional 
innovation policy was designed and delivered by a small group of politicians and officials 
who shared similar mental maps and (ii) the quasi-irreversibility of investments in 
technological infrastructure, which meant that huge sunk costs made it very difficult to 
jettison a repertoire that was predicated on technology centres and the like (Valdaliso et al, 
2014).  
However, these path dependent forces were complemented by the institutional innovations of 
the STI Plan of 2001-2004, which introduced a radically new science-based dimension into 
the RIP repertoire. The most prominent examples of this new science-based departure were 
the following: Cooperative Research Centres were created by the Department of Industry 
with a mandate to develop priority sectors that were new or under-developed in the region, 
such as bio-science, nano-science and renewable energy; Basic Excellence Research Centres 
were created by the Department of Education to develop basic research in association with 
universities and these focused on bio-physics, materials physics, cognition and language, and 
climate change; the Basque Foundation for Science (Ikerbasque) was created in 2007 with a 
mandate to attract and retain scientific talent from around the world to strengthen the region’s 
basic research base; and a dedicated regional innovation agency, Innobasque, was also 
created in 2007 as a private-public partnership to promote innovation throughout Basque 
society in association with the business community and civil society organisations.  Although 
these initiatives were designed to update the Basque RIP repertoire, by creating agencies and 
centres that were far more attuned to the goal of knowledge creation, they also exacerbated 
the problem of institutional complexity (Morgan, 2013a; Valdaliso et al, 2014). 
The problem of institutional complexity reached a critical stage with the introduction of the 
new science-based infrastructure, precipitating a process of institutional cannibalism as the 
technology centres, in their quest for new revenue streams, began to seek a new science 
mandate, a move that threatens to duplicate the work of the CICs and the BERCs. The latter 
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argue that the Basque system is now too dense, too complex and too expensive because each 
centre costs a small fortune and, with the “age of austerity”, the funds are no longer available 
to sustain a RIS that was crafted in an age of plenty (Morgan, 2013b). Growing institutional 
complexity has exacerbated the problem of institutional coherence at a number of different 
levels. Within the Basque Government there has been growing rivalry between the Industry 
Department and the Education Department, which seeks to play a more prominent role in the 
RIP repertoire. Another form of rivalry was precipitated by the creation of Innobasque, the 
new innovation agency that has to co-exist with SPRI, the regional development agency that 
was responsible for industrial innovation in the narrow sense. Finally, there is the historic 
rivalry between the Basque Government and the three Provincial Governments of the Basque 
Country, a rivalry that undermines the coherence of the RIP repertoire and which does not 
“serve the best interests of the region” (OECD, 2011:214).  
The Basque Government has sought to use the RIS3 exercise as an opportunity to address the 
problem of institutional complexity.  The RIS3 strategy is the centrepiece of the new STI 
Plan and it aims to create more institutional coherence in two ways: (i) by introducing 
stronger and clearer leadership through the STI Council and (ii) by streamlining the STI 
network (Gobierno Vasco, 2014). The STI Council is the highest authority in the Basque 
Country and it was created in 2007 to introduce more leadership and more coherence into the 
STI network (RVCTI), which had acquired a staggering 153 members by 2013 (Valdaliso et 
al, 2014). To build more coherence and consensus around the new RIS3 strategy the 
composition of the STI Council has now been extended to include some of the most powerful 
actors in the RVCTI network, so that it now includes all government tiers, the three Basque 
universities, the technology centres and the new agencies, Innobasque and Ikerbasque. 
Although this reform was predicated on the idea that a more inclusive STI Council would 
make for a stronger and more coherent body, it also runs the risk that it will institutionalise a 
weak consensus that proves unable or unwilling to take decisions that adversely affect its new 
membership. However, this problem seems to have been overcome for the moment because it 
has taken a series of bold decisions to streamline the RVCTI network to reduce duplication 
and rivalry and to create a new system of interdepartmental and inter-institutional 
mechanisms to monitor progress under the direction of a new STI Commissioner who reports 
directly to the President (Gobierno Vasco, 2014). 
Although the Basque Country has not been short of novelty in the design of its RIS3 strategy, 
the latter is actually a judicious mix of continuity-in-change rather than novelty per se. The 
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three strategic priorities at the heart of the RIS3 strategy – namely advanced manufacturing, 
energy and biosciences and health – are a perfect illustration of this point because they 
combine traditional sectoral strengths (in energy and manufacturing) with new technological 
ambitions (in bio-science and nano-technology). However, while the new RIS3 strategy talks 
about the need for a new and more open RIP repertoire, local experts detect enormous inertia 
and resistance to the  new approaches, especially from “incumbent actors and constituencies 
of these policies with vested interests” (Valdaliso et al, 2014:403).  
 
 
3.2 The RIP Repertoire in Wales 
Wales is much closer to the stereotype of an old industrial region than the Basque Country, 
not least because it never found a new economic vocation to replace the decline of its high 
wage coal and steel industries (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Of all the depressed industrial 
areas of inter-war Britain, the only one that retains this status today is West Wales and the 
Valleys, which is officially classified as a “less developed region” in the EU taxonomy. 
Although the reasons for relative economic decline are always complex and multiple, the 
main reasons in Wales are twofold: (i) the fact that low wage/low skill foreign direct 
investment replaced the high waged coal and steel industries and (ii) the fact that Wales 
failed to generate sufficient high growth indigenous firms, a reflection of its low wage/low 
skill occupational profile (Morgan, 2013a).   
The advent of a directly-elected Welsh Government in 1999 doubly confounded supporters of 
democratic devolution. Firstly, it was widely assumed that political devolution would yield an 
economic dividend and help stem the process of relative decline, but the opposite occurred as 
Wales continued to fall further and further behind the UK in terms of GDP per capita. 
Secondly, democratic devolution was expected to spawn a new era of political pluralism, but 
once again the opposite occurred when the Welsh Government surprisingly abolished the 
arm’s length agencies in its intermediate governance tier, the most famous of which was the 
Welsh Development Agency (WDA), the first regional development agency of its kind when 
it was founded in 1976 and the template for SPRI, the Basque regional development agency. 
Abolishing the WDA and transferring its functions to the civil service was rationalised in 
terms of democratic accountability, but in reality it reflected a desire to exert more day-to-day 
political control over a development agency that had enjoyed a degree of relative autonomy 
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from the risk-averse compliance culture of the civil service, a culture that extolled process 
over outcome, control over competence. The abolition of the arm’s length agencies rendered 
Wales a much more state-centric system in which institutional diversity and intellectual 
pluralism were significantly reduced. Loss of diversity makes for group-think and this in turn 
makes it more difficult to challenge the conventional wisdom, especially the conventional 
political wisdom, always a difficult task in Wales because of the hegemony of the Labour 
Party, which has dominated Welsh politics for the best part of a century (Morgan and Upton, 
2005; Morgan, 2013c). 
Although Wales and the Basque Country are often bracketed together as “old industrial 
regions”, they are actually much less alike than is commonly supposed and this is why their 
RIP repertoires are so radically different. The fact that a hegemonic political party is common 
to both – Labour in Wales, PNV in the Basque Country – conceals more than it reveals 
because, while the Welsh Government is a recent creation, the Basque Government was 
founded in 1980, affording it that much longer to develop its competence and confidence as a 
public administration. A more significant political difference is the fact that single party 
hegemony did not deliver policy continuity in Wales as it did in the Basque Country because 
the Welsh commitment to regional innovation policy has been fitful and driven by external 
factors, like the need to comply with EU Structural Funds.  
Economic differences are even more important than the political differences because, while 
the Basque Country has a range of strong indigenous companies, as well as the world famous 
Mondragon group of cooperatives, Wales has historically had a very weak indigenous 
business class. This radical difference in endogenous capacity helps to explain why Wales 
has been so highly attuned to the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), a path that was 
less open to the Basques while ETA prosecuted a campaign of violence that claimed more 
than 1000 lives before a “definitive cessation” of armed conflict was announced in 2011.  
Taken together, these economic and political differences help us to understand why the 
repertoires have evolved along such different paths. Indeed, it is not too much of an 
exaggeration to say that the central elements of the Welsh repertoire – namely the emphasis 
on technology transfer from foreign branch plants on the one hand and the knowledge 
generation role of universities on the other – were for many years conspicuous by their 
absence in the Basque repertoire because the FDI option was constrained and the scientific 
capacity of the university sector was poor. Although Wales was one of the first regions to 
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pilot a regional innovation strategy in the EU, under the auspices of the Regional Technology 
Plans of the early 1990s, the subsequent political commitment to innovation has been 
episodic, with the result that policy learning was stymied (Huggins and Pugh, 2015).  
If innovation has been an occasional theme in the Welsh regional policy repertoire, the 
attraction of FDI and the knowledge-generating role of universities have been hardy 
perennials in the policy mix, even though the economic dividend of each can be questioned. 
On the FDI front, foreign branch plants that became “embedded” are few and far between, 
while many of the Japanese consumer electronics plants either closed or migrated to lower 
cost locations in Eastern Europe and Asia. If the limits of conventional FDI policy are now 
clear for all to see, the knowledge-generating role of Welsh universities is still something of a 
sacred cow because of its presumed economic dividends, but this presumption needs to be 
scrutinised in Wales (Huggins and Kitagawa, 2012). The Welsh Government is aware of the 
problem because, when it launched its “new direction” for economic renewal in 2010, it 
acknowledged that “R&D in Wales is dominated by the Higher Education sector where there 
are fewer incentives to commercialise research” (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010:30).  
Nevertheless, the “new direction” strategy proceeded to select four priority R&D sectors – 
ICT, low carbon, health/biosciences and advanced engineering – largely on the basis of 
university research criteria (WAG, 2010:31). Here lies the central problem of the Welsh RIP 
repertoire: it privileges the knowledge-generating role of universities on the one hand but, on 
the other, it concedes that the key barrier to innovation in Wales is the weak business demand 
for university-based knowledge (Welsh Government, 2013). If the demand-side remains 
weak, the regional innovation paradox will persist because the RIS3 strategy accords a higher 
priority than ever before to the role of universities and the latter are better equipped to excel 
in science than innovation. 
The knowledge-generating role of universities is not the only part of the old regional 
repertoire that resurfaced in the Welsh RIS3 strategy, providing tangible evidence of policy 
path dependence. The priority sectors at the heart of the Welsh RIS3 are also the same as the 
priority sectors selected in 2010, a choice that was effectively set in aspic when the same 
sectors were endorsed by the newly appointed Chief Scientific Adviser for Wales and made 
the centrepiece of the first ever Science for Wales strategy (Welsh Government, 2012).   The 
fact that so many traditional policy priorities have re-appeared in the Welsh RIS3 has led to 
the charge that “the smart specialisation process is primarily being employed to rationalise 
and justify the Welsh Government’s pre-existing sector-based approach to innovation and 
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economic development. Certain important elements of smart specialisation have been 
sidelined in the process, in particular the process of entrepreneurial discovery” (Pugh, 
2014:152).  Where the Basques are creating new “entrepreneurial discovery spaces” to foster 
public-private search processes, the Welsh Government continues to use old sector advisory 
groups in its priority sectors, all of which pre-date the RIS3 strategy.  
The main concerns surrounding the Welsh RIS3 strategy are that it lacks novelty, with 
respect to both economic search and institutional innovation, and that it is too state-centric. 
The limits of a state-centric RIP repertoire in Wales were painfully exposed by the Technium 
experience, when a network of high technology incubation centres costing over £100 million 
imploded because it was driven by the political priorities of the regional state rather than the 
commercial needs of the business community. The Technium experience also exposed the 
weakness of the universities as a source of spin-out companies, underlining the fact that they 
are better at generating knowledge than commercialising it (Morgan, 2013a). 
If Technium exposed the limits of a state-centric repertoire, the Specific project illustrates the 
scope for an alternative repertoire in which the state’s role is closer to that of a curator than a 
controller of innovation, prefiguring the embedded state that we discuss in the following 
section. Specific is a multi-actor, open innovation project driven by two key partners – 
Swansea University and Tata Steel – and it has developed smart coatings that generate, store 
and release solar energy, enabling buildings to become their own power stations in effect. 
The role of the regional state has been enabling, helping other actors to help themselves and 
problem-solving at critical junctures. Where the regional state was censured for its 
overweening role in Technium, it was deemed to be exemplary in the case of Specific, not 
least because it was more attuned to the learning-by-doing ethos of the RIS3 programme 
(Morgan, 2013a). Although this path-breaking role proves the regional state can embrace 
novel ways of working, local experts argue that the overall effect of the regional state has 
been to stifle innovation because of a misallocation of resources to pet projects and vested 
interests and “rent-seeking undertaken by government itself”, which helps to explain why the 
regional innovation paradox continues to exist in Wales even after fifteen years of devolution 
(Huggins and Pugh, 2015). 
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3. Conclusions and Implications: towards the embedded state and institutional 
entrepreneurship?  
The RIS3 programme offers a unique opportunity to explore the interplay of institutions, 
innovation and development. Although there is growing agreement that institutions matter, 
there is less agreement about exactly how they matter, when they matter and whether they are 
a cause or a consequence of development. While the vast corpus of this institutional literature 
is devoted to national level debates (Rodrik, 2003, North, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012), there is growing interest in the sub-national level (Gertler, 2010; Farole et al, 2011; 
Mackinnon et al, 2009; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Tomaney, 2013). Even though regional 
innovation policy has been evolving for 25 years, the RIS3 programme is the most ambitious 
iteration with respect to the scale of resources involved and the demands placed on public 
sector institutions like the regional state, which is expected to orchestrate a more 
collaborative economic search process (the “entrepreneurial discovery process”) and craft 
more inclusive governance arrangements to enhance the diversity of “voice” (European 
Commission, 2012; Foray, 2014). In old industrial regions where political power is 
monopolised by a single party, it is often the case that the nurturing of novelty is that much 
more challenging (Morgan, 2013c).  
One of the great ironies of the RIS3 programme is that it expects the public sector to be more 
agile, creative and experimental when the “age of austerity” is eviscerating public sector 
budgets and undermining the competence and confidence of public bodies, especially in the 
LDRs that are more dependent on the public sector (Morgan, 2015). The “age of austerity” 
has compounded the long-standing developmental problems associated with the regional 
innovation paradox, which reflects the fact that the regional economy and the regional polity 
are unable to absorb and deploy the funds that are earmarked to promote innovation (Oughton 
et al, 2002).  In this final section the aim is twofold: to synthesize the comparative analysis 
and to suggest how we might enhance the field of regional innovation policy studies. 
As “stateless nations” the Basque Country and Wales are instructive prisms through which to 
explore the interplay of institutions and development for a number of reasons: they have 
enjoyed a high degree of democratic devolution on account of strong national identities; their 
regional states have been actively involved in economic renewal for decades; and one- party 
hegemony is present in both cases. Even so, to bracket them together as “old industrial 
regions” conceals as much as it reveals because the more granular the focus, the more 
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different they appear, particularly in terms of endogenous economic capacity and political 
commitment to regional innovation policy, and these differences are reflected in their RIP 
repertoires. The idea of a regional innovation policy repertoire was used to signal a set of 
regularly employed cognitive maps, policies and practices that are routinely used to frame 
and fashion a particular model of regional development, an idea somewhat akin to “the 
combination of beliefs, institutions, and artifactual structure that have been inherited from the 
past” (North, 2005:80). A repertoire implies that a “policy mix” is a more embedded and path 
dependent assemblage than conventional policy studies would have us believe.  
The Basque repertoire is predicated on three widely held ideas: (i) that manufacturing matters 
(ii) that endogenous capacity is key and (iii) that the regional state has a major role to play in 
animating innovation and development in partnership with industry-led associations (Morgan, 
2013b). These ideas informed the political commitment to sustained R&D spending on the 
part of successive Basque governments, a commitment that was honoured by nationalists and 
socialists despite their other ideological differences. The sustained R&D spending was 
largely invested in a network of technology centres designed to keep mature sectors on an 
innovative footing. As the accent of innovation policy evolved from technology transfer to 
knowledge generation, the Basque government has sought to build up a scientific capacity in 
targeted sectors (like bio-science and nano-technology for example) and it has created new 
centres in which to nurture this novel capacity. To compensate for the lack of indigenous 
scientific talent, Ikerbasque was created to manage a global talent attraction programme to 
recruit and retain star scientists, a programme that has exceeded its original expectations 
(Morgan, 2013b).  
This RIP repertoire forms the basis for the Basque RIS3 strategy, which builds on the past but 
which also breaks with the past in three critical ways. First, the RIS3 strategy was fashioned 
in a more open and iterative way than any previous STI plan because it involved departments 
other than the Department of Industry, the dominant department in the Basque Government, 
as well as the partners in the wider STI network. Second, the RIS3 exercise is being used as 
the occasion to radically simplify the complexity of the Basque regional innovation system, a 
reform that is also a response to the financial pressures of austerity. Third, the Basque 
Government is creating new “entrepreneurial discovery spaces” where public and private 
partners can explore projects of mutual interest and these spaces will involve the cluster 
associations that have been painstakingly built up over the past decade. In other words, the 
Basque RIS3 strategy aims to introduce novel institutional arrangements for economic search 
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and inclusive governance into a repertoire than has been evolving for the past thirty years, 
highlighting a degree of regional policy continuity that may be without parallel in Europe.    
The Welsh repertoire has been much more state-centric and this is partly due to the 
ideological disposition of the Welsh (Labour) Government and partly because the latter does 
not have the strong economic interlocutors that are available to its Basque counterpart. While 
the regional state in the Basque Country has been pervasive, it has not been invasive: that is 
to say, it has respected the principle of subsidiarity and refrained from micro-managing the 
industry associations it has funded so generously. Reflecting a very different economic 
context, the Welsh repertoire is predicated on a number of deeply held beliefs within the 
regional state: (i) that FDI is a necessity because of weak endogenous capacity (ii) that 
universities are drivers of the knowledge economy and (iii) that the regional state needs to 
play a pro-active role in innovation to animate a private sector that tends to be weak and risk-
averse. Although this repertoire is not without its critics, especially as regards the emphasis 
on FDI, the overall policy mix has been sustained by two powerful political forces, namely 
the Welsh (Labour) Government’s commitment to a pro-active regional state and a university 
lobby that presents itself as the driver of the knowledge economy even though its expertise 
lies in science not innovation. The contrast between science and innovation was all too 
apparent in the weighting and resourcing of the two strategies: the former was delivered by 
the Chief Scientific Adviser, a newly created post, and launched with great public fanfare; 
while the latter was very much a poor relation, with no Chief Innovation Adviser and no 
public launch. Furthermore, to promote the scientific cachet of Welsh universities, a radically 
new scheme (Ser Cymru) has been launched to attract global “stars” to Wales (Welsh 
Government, 2012).  
To a large extent the strengths and weaknesses of the two regional economies are the polar 
opposites of each other: while the Basques have a strong indigenous business capacity and a 
weak university sector, Wales has a weak indigenous business capacity and a relatively 
strong university sector. In both cases the regional state has designed a RIS3 strategy that 
incorporates large elements of their traditional RIP repertoires, underlining the power of 
policy path dependence. Of the two repertoires, the Basques have made more effort to 
experiment with novel institutional arrangements for economic search and inclusive 
governance. This partly corroborates the early results from other regions, where it appears 
that the main effect of the RIS3 programme to date has been to induce more participatory 
forms of regional governance (Kroll, 2014).       
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The field of regional innovation studies in and beyond the case study regions can learn a great 
deal from the insights of the new industrial policy (NIP) literature, where the state has been 
rehabilitated as an economic actor and enjoined to work in and through networks to catalyse 
innovation and development (Rodrik, 2004; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013; Foray, 2014). 
One of the core ideas of the NIP perspective is that industrial policy is essentially a process of 
economic self-discovery, a process less about omniscient planners and more about an 
interactive process of strategic cooperation between public and private sectors where the aims 
are to elicit information about opportunities and constraints and generate better informed 
policy initiatives (Rodrik, 2004). In this perspective the key challenge is to get the process of 
engagement right rather than obsessing about particular policy instruments. The role of the 
state is to be an intrinsic part of the interactive learning-by-doing process; that is to say an 
embedded state rather than the arm’s length state that is enshrined in neoliberal narratives of 
development. The idea of industrial policy as an iterative process of economic self-discovery 
is compelling but challenging: compelling because it resonates with the realist conception of 
innovation as a collective social end avour; but challenging too because the public sector is 
generally ill-equipped to deal with novelty and experimentation as they necessarily entail 
failure. In other words, while the conception of the embedded state seems highly attuned to 
the exacting demands of the RIS3 programme, it faces a number of barriers, the most 
important of which is the disconnect between the rhetoric of innovation discourse, which 
calls for a more experimental public sector, and the reality of a public sector compliance 
culture that is intolerant of mistakes and failure (Morgan, 2015). 
Regional innovation studies would also benefit from more engagement with the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, which aims to restore the themes of agency, interests and power 
to the centre of organisational analysis (Garud et al, 2007). Regional scholars have begun to 
draw on this literature to overcome the static and apolitical nature of much regional 
innovation studies, where actors are treated as components of a system rather than purposive 
agents that strive to change the institutions in which they are embedded. The value of the 
institutional entrepreneurship perspective is that it “provides an analytical framework of how 
various agents behave – how they interact, relate and evolve with wider institutional 
constellations” (Sotarauta and Pulkkinen, 2011:100; see also Uyarra, 2010).  In other words, 
a more dynamic and politically sensitive perspective, in which agency is afforded greater 
prominence, would help regional innovation scholars to better understand (and explain) the 
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tensions and trade-offs in all institutions between the competing logics of exploration versus 
exploitation and adaptation versus adaptability (Grabher, 1993; Boschma, 2015).   
One of the central questions in regional innovation policy studies is the extent to which sub-
national institutions can or should shoulder the burden for innovation and development in 
their jurisdictions. With respect to the RIS3 programme it should never be forgotten that the 
programme was originally conceived as a multi-scalar endeavour in which supra-national, 
national and sub-national institutions were required to collaborate for mutually beneficial 
ends. Realising that original design may ultimately prove to be the greatest challenge of all. 
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